The last days of Rabaul : (December 13, 1941 to January 23, 1942) by Gill, J. C. H. (James Connal Howard)
635 
THE LAST DAYS OF RABAUL 
(December 13, 1941 to January 23, 1942) 
(All Rights Reserved) 
[By J. C. H. GILL, B.A., LL.B.] 
(Read before the Meeting of The Royal Historical 
Society of Queensland on March 23, 1961.) 
As I understand it history is a study that should 
be objective and based on the reported (preferably 
written) doings and sayings of persons, notable or 
otherwise, which serve to give us a picture of the past 
and which, we hope, is in the main correct. 
However, to enable the historian to be objective 
we have in the first place to have the subjective record, 
oral or written, of the humble reporter of contem-
porary events. 
The events I am now going to relate to you are my 
own experiences and those of others which I was able 
to record during the period from December 13, 1941, 
to January 23, 1942, when the Japanese tide of con-
quest commenced and began its rapid course towards 
its flood. 
I do not intend to try and set forth before you 
the overall strategic picture, but will refer to it as 
necessary to give point to what I am telling you about 
the investment and capture by the Japanese of 
Rabaul, which is the locus of my narrative. 
For the comments on the Japanese strategy and 
the pattern of events generally, which were outside our 
experience at Rabaul, I am indebted to Commander 
E. A. Feldt, O.B.E., R.A.N., whose book "The Coast-
watchers" sets forth the position at large, and as 
regards the South West Pacific in particular, with 
admirable succinctness and clarity. 
Commander Feldt was the Supervising Intellig-
ence Officer, North Eastern Area. As such he was 
responsible for Naval Intelligence arrangements in 
North Queensland, Papua, New Guinea, the Solomon 
Islands and the New Hebrides. He was, himself, based 
at Townsville, which was also the North Eastern Area 
Headquarters of the Royal Australian Air Force. 
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Naval Coast Watching Organisation 
Commander Feldt's primary responsibility was 
the extension and maintenance of the Naval Coast 
Watching Organisation in the Territories (both Papua 
and New Guinea) and Solomon Islands. He had to 
select and appoint personnel, and place teleradios at 
strategic points so as to establish a reporting screen 
and communications network effectively covering the 
northern and north-eastern approaches to Australia, 
giving warning of any possible impending attack and 
protecting the country against surprise of any sort in 
its most vulnerable quarter. 
The Naval Coast Watching Organisation was not a 
new thing. It had had its genesis in 1919. In its broad 
outline, the scheme provided for the appointment of 
selected personnel, adjacent to or on the coast, and 
with means of speedy communication with Navy 
Office, Melbourne. The Coastwatchers would, in time 
of war, report instantly any unusual or suspicious 
happenings in their area, sightings of strange ships or 
aircraft, floating mines and other matters of defence 
interest. Appointees included reliable persons such as 
Postmasters, Police and other Government servants: 
missionaries at mission stations on little frequented 
parts of the coast; pilots of civil airlines on or near 
coastal routes; and in the Territories of Papua and 
New Guinea and in the British Solomon Islands, Patrol 
Officers, District Officers and other officials, besides 
planters. 
Commander Feldt's Initial Task 
From the time of the outbreak of war with 
Germany in September, 1939, Commander Feldt had 
been busy breathing life into the dormant Coast-
watching Organisation in the North Eastern Area and 
extending it as much as funds would permit. The 
main cost was the provision of Teleradios; the per-
sonnel were in the main civilian volunteers who gave 
their services without payment. Feldt's initial 
appointment was that of Staff Officer (Intelligence), 
Port Moresby. His initial task was to put on an opera-
tional basis existing coastwatching stations in the 
Territories of Papua and New Guinea and to decide on 
additional coastwatching stations which would cover 
all the sea lanes to Australia from the north east. In 
1939 the main concern was with sea approaches but 
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Feldt was also alive to the importance of air power. 
As a consequence his coastwatchers were so placed 
that when the time came, as will be clearly seen from 
what I have to tell you later, they served the dual role 
of air watchers as well as coast watchers with great 
success. 
Quite early in the piece Feldt also established a 
close and harmonious relationship with the Royal 
Australian Air Force which lasted throughout the war. 
Credit for this must be shared with the Commanding 
Officer, Squadron Leader (as he was then) J. Alex-
ander, of No. 11 General Reconnaissance, stationed at 
Port Moresby and also with the Directors of Naval 
and Air Intelligence in Melbourne who supported the 
recommendations of their local commanders and 
gained the approvals of the respective Chiefs of Staff. 
New Factor in Pacific Strategy 
By the year 1941 it became evident that a new 
factor would have to be considered in Pacific strategy. 
Up till then the main menace to the peace of the 
Pacific had been German Raiders preying on British 
and allied shipping; however, it became evident that 
Japan was getting ready to make a major move in the 
Pacific. Her objective was obscure but South East 
Asia was regarded as a strong probability in the light 
of the propaganda she began to disseminate about the 
Greater East Asia Co. Properity Sphere. The big "if" 
about all this speculation, however, was whether Japan 
would run the risk of an all out confiict with the United 
States of America with its strong Pacific Fleet — a 
matter the Japanese were to resolve in a typically 
oriental and, we must concede, daring manner. 
Early in 1941 Australia began making the disposi-
tions of her forces that were to pertain at the outbreak 
of the Pacific War. These included the sending of the 
8th Division A.LF. to Malaya and a battalion to 
Ambon. In the area we are more particularly con-
cerned with, the 2/22 Battalion A.LF. accompanied by 
an anti-aircraft detachment, an R.A.A. detachment for 
fixed defences and Headquarters Troops comprising in 
all some 1,500 troops were sent to Rabaul. Port 
Moresby already had a militia battalion, the 9th, a 
fixed defences detachment of R.A.A. and Headquarters 
Troops. The Papua-New Guinea Area was constituted 
the 8th Military District under Brigadier B. Morris as 
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commandant whilst the Rabaul Garrison was under the 
command of Colonel J. Scanlan as Area Commander. 
The Air Force was moved from Port Moresby to 
Townsville where an Area Combined Headquarters for 
the North Eastern Area was constituted. The Air 
Officer Commanding N.E.A. was Air Commodore F. A. 
Lukis. Advanced operational Bases (A.O.B.'s) were 
set up at Port Moresby, Rabaul and Tulagi in the 
British Solomon Islands Protectorate. 
The Naval Officer in Charge, Port Moresby, (Cdr. 
V. C. Eddy,, R.N. (Retd.)) was moved to Townsville as 
N.O.I.C, Townsville, whilst a Junior Officer (Lt. Cdr. 
A. G. Monteith, R.A.N.R.) was appointed from the 
Mainland as N.O.I.C, Port Moresby. 
Feldt's appointment as S.O. (I) Port Moresby was 
terminated and he was appointed Supervising Intellig-
ence Officer North Eastern Area with Naval Intellig-
ence Officers serving under him at Port Moresby, 
Rabaul, Tulagi and, later at Vila in the New Hebrides. 
The Warden of Wau 
Lieut. H. A. Mackenzie, R.A.N. (Retd.), who like 
Feldt was an original graduate of the Naval College at 
Jervis Bay, was the N.I.O. Rabaul. Like Feldt he had 
left the Navy not long after World War I, but had gone 
to New Guinea as a trader and planter whereas Feldt 
had gone into the administration as a Patrol Officer. 
At the outbreak of war in 1939 Mackenzie had a 
plantation at Megigi on the North Coast of New 
Britain, whilst Feldt was a Senior District Officer in 
the New Guinea Service with the somewhat awe-
inspiring title of "Warden of Wau." Mackenzie was 
appointed assistant S.O. (I), Port Moresby in 1940 
which post he held until the reshuffle in 1941. 
I was Naval Intelligence Officer, Port Moresby, 
where I had served in various capacities as rating and 
officer from September 1939, until May 1941 when I 
was given my Intelligence appointment. 
In November, 1941, a Sub-Lieutenant G. Lock-
hart was appointed to Rabaul to assist Mackenzie. 
However, shortly after his aiTival in Rabaul he con-
tracted dysentery and was sent to Hospital. (To quote 
Feldt "There was some talk of his illness being caused 
by drinking water instead of beer, and so a self-
inflicted wound in the eyes of the Islanders" — the 
seasoned European residents of the Territory). Lock-
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hart was sent on a trip round the Group in a Burns 
Philp ship during his convalescence and was at sea 
when the Pacific War started. Both the ship and he 
were ordered to return to Australia, as a sick man 
would be of no use in Rabaul. You are allowed one 
guess as to who replaced him. 
I spent Sunday December 7, 1941, at Rouna, about 
20 miles inland from Port Moresby with some Army 
Officers inspecting possible communications sites. In 
the course of our trip there was some speculation as 
to whether the Japanese were really "cooking up" 
something. Feldt had told me in August that he 
thought that if Japan did not move within a month it 
was unlikely she would enter the war. The Army was 
divided in its views so the day ended without any 
positive agreement one way or the other as to what 
might happen. 
At War with Japan 
We knew the next morning — by 7 a.m. someone 
had picked up a broadcast about the attack on Pearl 
Harbour. At 7.37 a.m. a signal was received from the 
Australian Commonwealth Naval Board "Total Japan 
repeat Total Japan" — this meant we were at war with 
Japan. Later in the day we heard more about the 
destruction as an effective offensive force of the United 
States Pacific Fleet. 
That night we had our first casualties of the 
Pacific War; a Catalina aircraft taking off for a Patrol 
at 10 p.m. made its take-off run, due to an error, on 
the wrong side of its flare path and crashed, with the 
loss of all its crew, on a hilly island called Gemi on the 
Western side of Port Moresby Harbour. Having been 
for a night flight in the same aircraft a bare three 
weeks before I had plenty to reflect on. 
Port Moresby began to buzz like a hornet's nest — 
albeit at that time a very small one. Papua's only 
resident Japanese — both of them elderley men who 
had lived at Samarai for years — were interned on 
December 9. I had met both Tom Tanaka and Mura 
Kama and whilst I do not think they were part of the 
Japanese war machine I suppose it was necessary in 
the interests of national security to intern them, 
especially as the Japanese had begun bombing Nauru 
and Ocean Island. 
^ On December 9 Rabaul was subjected to its first 
aerial inspection by a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft. 
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Japanese Capture Tarawa 
All trans-Pacific sailings by allied shipping were 
stopped on December 10 — any ships already at sea 
were ordered to make for the nearest friendly port. 
On this day Nauru and Ocean Island were again 
bombed whilst the Japanese landed in force and cap-
tured Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands. 
Then on December 11 I received orders to pro-
ceed to Rabaul by the first and quickest available 
means. The R.A.A.F. had nothing going that way so 
I managed to get a passage in the W.R. Carpenter Air-
liner departing from Port Moresby at 11 a.m. on 
December 12. The N.O.I.C. made unhappy noises when 
he found he had to take on my Intelligence Organisa-
tion in Papua until my relief arrived, but he could not 
"buck" a Naval Board order — much as he would have 
liked to. 
After an afternoon and night spent in Salamaua I 
arrived in Rabaul at 8.45 a.m. on Saturday, December 
13, 1941. Rabaul is situated on Simpson Harbour a 
vast extinct volcanic crater into which the sea has 
broken in from the South. On the western side of the 
Harbour the hills rise steeply from the water's edge. 
Northward is a small flat widening out from a few 
hundred yards on the north shore to nearly a mile on 
the eastern side. A low saddle due north of the Har-
bour connects the plateau of northern New Britain to 
the ridge which surrounds the flooded crater. Sweep-
ing east from the saddle the ridge rises to the peak of 
the North Daughter then trends around southward 
falling and again rising to the bare kunai-covered 
slopes of the Mother Mountain, falling and again rising 
to the South Daughter whose southern edge is washed 
by the sea at Praed Point. The ridge and peaks form 
a peninsula which is not ineptly called the Crater 
Peninsula. In 1941 the only reminder of Rabaul's 
volcanic past was the single low crater, at the foot of 
the western side of the South Daughter, known as 
Matupi, w^hich sighed out smoke, fumes and pumice 
dust from time to time whilst an occasion euria or 
earth tremor set everything in Rabaul rattling and 
shaking for a minute or so at a time. ^^^ 
I realise it has taken me some time to get to 
(I) During 1941 Plans had been made for Rabaul to be converted into a 
huge allied base, but the swiftness of the .Japanese advance prevented 
these plans ever getting beyond the blue print stage. 
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Rabaul but I consider that what I have already told 
you was necessary to give point to what I have yet to 
tell you. Before settling down to the day to day 
account of the time that Rabaul was to remain in our 
hands, I must, however, give you a brief account of the 
dispositions of the opposing forces in the North East 
Area at the time. 
Dispositions of Opposing Forces 
The Japanese had made good use of the time 
between wars and particularly the 1930's to militarise 
all the former German Island Colonies over which they 
had been granted mandates. In particular they 
covered the North East Area with a virtual umbrella 
of Island bases from the Palau Group in the West to 
the Marshall's in the East. The capture of Tarawa on 
December 10, 1941, was achieved to give, in time, pro-
tection against any attempt to by-pass the Marshall's 
to the South of that group. As far as Rabaul was con-
cerned the nearest unpleasant neighbours were Truk, 
some 700 miles almost due north, and Ponape, about 
800 miles North East, in the Carolines. Closer still 
was the lonely outpost of Kapingamarangi only 320 
miles north east of Rabaul. 
On our side apart from the Rabaul Garrison, the 
Army had an Independent Company at Kavieng in the 
North of New Ireland with platoons at Manus in the 
Admiralty Islands and Buka Passage at the Northern 
end of Bougainville. 
Our coastwatchers, working from West to East, 
were located at Wuvulu Island, Ninigo, Maron in the 
Hermit Group, Lorengan on Manus, Emiran North of 
New Ireland, Kavieng, Tabar East of New Ireland, 
Namatani on the east coast of central New Ireland, 
Anir and Nissan in the sea lane between New Ireland 
and Buka Island and at Kessa on Buka Island. There 
were numerous others elsewhere in New Britain, New 
Guinea and the Solomons, but apart from the Coast-
watcher at Mioko on Duke of York Island in St. 
Georges Channel between New Britain and New 
Ireland, they play no part in this present account. 
Our Air Force Bases you already know, with 
Rabaul, of course, being the vital one in this narrative. 
On the day I arrived in Rabaul I found Mackenzie 
simmering with wrath because the civilian coast-
watcher at Maron had evacuated the Island but left his 
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Teleradio and coastwatching papers behind in his 
house. The Teleradio was fitted, in addition to its 
ordinary crystal, with what we called an "X" Crystal 
which transmitted urgent coastwatching signals on a 
secret frequency on which a 24-hour watch was kept 
in both Rabaul and Port Moresby. 
Sunday, December 14 was uneventful. On Decern-
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ber 15 Mackenzie went to Maron by R.A.A.F. Catalina 
to recover the Teleradio and papers. During his absence 
I had to cope with a trans-Pacific refugee, the Hoegh 
Silverstar a Norwegian Ship, which, in a low grade 
code, announced its expected arrival at Rabaul next 
morning. With some severity I instructed it to pro-
ceed to Port Moresby without delay and to maintain 
wireless silence. Some hours later the Hoegh Silver-
star caused quite a flutter for the coastwatcher at 
Nissan when it hove over the northern horizon. Towns-
ville got quite stirred up too over the Nissan report, 
as the signal I sent to Naval Board repeated to Towns-
ville and Port Moresby about the Hoegh Silverstar 
somehow did not get to Townsville until hours after 
the coastwatcher's report had been received there 
through us at Rabaul. 
First Blow Against Enemy 
On this day the North East Area struck its first 
blow against the enemy — the first operation by either 
side in the area. A Hudson bomber went to reconnoitre 
Kapingamarangi where it arrived at 11 a.m. and found 
a ship unloading there. It got a hot reception with 
machine gun fire from both ship and shore. At 2 p.m. 
our striking force — a whole three Hudson Bombers 
— took off for Kapingamarangi arriving there at 4.30 
p.m. The ship was just departing, but the Hudsons 
failed to register a hit with their 12 x 250 lb. bombs. 
The aircrews were willing enough, but apparently they 
found a moving target was not as easy to hit as a fixed 
target on a bombing range. 
December 16 saw the arrival of the first flight of 
our fighter screen — three Wirraways. The conver-
sion of training aircraft into front line fighters was 
not calculated to inspire confidence in the Rabaul 
Garrison which was already starting to feel rather 
lonely. 
On instructions from the Commonwealth Govern-
ment the Territory Administration issued a compulsory 
order for the evacuation of all European women and 
children from the Territory in vessels to be provided. 
All evacuees had to be in Rabaul by December 20. For 
the next four or five days there was a constant stream 
of little ships into Rabaul bringing the women and 
children in from New Britain, New Ireland, the 
Admiraltys, Buka, Bougainville and all the numerous 
small islands on which there were plantations. As 
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usual on such occasions the town took on an air of 
hectic gaiety, but it was only a mask for the under-
lying disquiet. For many families the disquiet was not 
unwarranted. The Commonwealth made no provision 
for the evacuation of civilian males who were left to 
shift for themselves. Many never got out and were 
interned by the Japanese. The bulk of these unfortu-
nates were subsequently lost when the Monte Video 
Maru was torpedoed by a U.S. Submarine off New Ire-
land some months later. So some of the partings that 
took place in Rabaul between December 16 and 22 
were final. 
On December 17 we received word that the Burns 
Philp vessels Neptuna and Macdhui were to sail from 
Port Moresby the following day for Rabaul to take the 
evacuees to Australia. 
Fighter Screen of Six Wirraways 
At 1 p.m. an additional four Wirraways arrived 
from Lae. We now had a fighter screen of six. A 
further three straggled in over the next few days. 
However, the whole nine were never serviceable at the 
one time — six remained a fair average for fighters 
available at any given time. 
An intelligence signal conveyed the news that the 
Japanese shipping had all left Tarawa in the Gilberts 
and was concentrated at Butaritari, the most northerly 
of the Gilberts, probably because it was a safer anchor-
age. 
We struck again at Kapingamarangi on December 
18 when one Hudson went there on an armed recon-
naissance. It was over the atoll when attacked by two 
floatplanes but fought them off, damaging one in the 
process. It then bombed installations on the atoll, 
scoring hits in the face of anti-aircraft fire from four 
to six 3' ' guns. The captain of the Hudson estimated 
at least 1,000 personnel on the atoll. 
On December 18 and 19 we noted that of nine air-
craft sightings, including three by Army personnel 
near Vunakanau airfield, only two could be identified as 
friendly. Our Catalina aircraft were patrolling the sea 
lanes to the north and east almost continuously. These 
aircraft travelling at their most economical cruising 
speed of approximately 100 knots, could stay airborne 
for 16 to 20 hours at a stretch; this made them ideal 
reconnaissance aircraft. However, as with everything 
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else, we had too few of them and the aircraft and 
crews were required to fly so often and for so long that 
precious engine hours were soon used up and crews 
completely exhausted. In one classic case a Catalina 
and crew put in 70 hours on patrols between dawn on 
Monday and dusk on Friday. 
To get back to my narrative, it was reasonable to 
assume that the Japanese were also patrolling south 
from Truk and Ponape, and if using flying boats, could 
use Kapingamarangi as an intermediate refuelling 
base. This was one of the main reasons for the 
R.A.A.F.'s attention to this atoll. 
Enemy Air Patrols Step Up 
Accordingly, the unidentified aircraft sightings on 
December 18 anci 19 indicated a stepping up in Japan-
ese air patrol activity. 
In view of the increase in air sightings both 
friendly and unidentified, Feldt decreed December 20 
that coastwatchers should report sightings of all 
unrecognised aircraft in plain language. To code 
reports took too long to get them through to Rabaul. 
Townsville somewhat belatedly on December 20 
advised all concerned that the sighting originally made 
by Nissan on December 15 was the Hoegh Silverstar 
and not an enemy armed merchant cruiser as they had 
first considered it. 
The Macdhui arrived at 7.45 p.m. on December 20 
and the Neptuna at 7.45 a.m. on December 21 to 
embark evacuees from Rabaul. The embarkation was 
got under way without delay and Neptuna sailed at 
5.45 p.m. on December 22, whilst Macdhui sailed a few 
hours later at 11 p.m. 
With the departure of the women and children, 
Rabaul lost any semblance of normality it had prev-
iously enjoyed. Certainly an additional 57 evacuees 
arrived in during the next five days and were flown out 
by civil airline D.C.3's on December 28, but apart from 
these Rabaul had become a garrison town, and 
although it had as yet experienced no enemy action the 
feeling of being beleaguered was there, especially as 
far stronger British and American defence bastions 
elsewhere in the Pacific and South East Asia com-
menced to crumble and fall. 
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This calls to mind an incident of a week or so 
earlier when a coastwatching sighting report had 
somehow found its way to the Commander in Chief, 
Hongkong, as well as the usual addresses. The C. in 
C, Hongkong had signalled the N.^I.O., Rabaul, as 
follows: 
"Your signal. I am not concerned." 
When Hongkong shortly after started to catch it 
hot and strong from the Japanese, Mackenzie was 
sorely tempted to signal back — "Your signal of such 
and such a date. I bet you're concerned now." How-
ever, discretion triumphed over valour. 
On December 23 we were most intrigued to hear 
over Rome Radio's English Broadcast that the Japan-
ese had made a successful attack on British New 
Guinea. Whilst this report certainly beat the gun, it 
did indicate that we were evidently included in the 
Japanese scheme of conquest. 
The aircraft sighting reports continued to come 
in from coastwatchers with a fairly even distribution 
between friendly and unidentified (enemy). 
On Christmas Day, 1941 the R.A.A.F. again 
attacked Kapingamarangi with two Hudsons. They 
were in the vicinity of and over the atoll between 
10.45 a.m. and 11.35 a.m. They had a brush with two 
Japanese floatplanes which, however, they succeeded 
in fighting off and then dropped their bombs, with no 
observed hits, on the main section of the atoll. They 
arrived back at Rabaul unscathed (except for a bullet 
hole in the wing of one Hudson) at 2.5 p.m. At 2.10 
p.m. a four engined Japanese flying boat appeared out 
of a thick bank of cloud flew over Vunakanau airfield 
at 6,000 feet and disappeared into a cloud bank to the 
north. It was apparently a reconnaissance aircraft 
only as it dropped no bombs. All available Wirraways 
anci Hudsons took off in pursuit of it but were unsuc-
cessful in intercepting it. 
Boxing Day and December 27 were entirely 
uneventful. 
On December 28 Talasea, in Western New Britain, 
and Salamaua, Lae and Madang on the New Guinea 
mainland reported unidentified aircraft; this was prob-
ably the same aircraft in each case, having regard to 
the times of the sightings, and indicated the Japanese 
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were reconnoitring the other possible New Guinea 
strongpoints. 
Plight of Chinese Residents 
With the final clearance of European women and 
children evacuees it became evident that the Common-
wealth Government had no intention of doing anything 
about Rabaul's Chinese Population. Although China 
was our ally and had been at war with Japan for a 
number of years, the Chinese women and children in 
Rabaul were not evacuated but left to fend for them-
selves. This caused a good deal of bitterness among the 
Chinese men, several of whom told me that they would 
have willingly joined the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles, 
the Territory Militia force, but dared not now that 
their women and children were to be left to the mercies 
of the Japanese invaders. During January, 1942, 
most of the Rabaul Chinese set up camps in the bush 
outside Rabaul and elsewhere in the Gazelle Peninsula. 
Whilst their non-interventionist policy saved them 
from wholesale massacre, they had a hard time under 
the Japanese regime and many died from disease and 
ill-treatment. 
Jervis, the Coastwatcher at Nissan, reported at 
9.39 a.m. on December 29 that he had just got word 
that a large plane had been down on the water to the 
west of the island since 6 a.m. A Hudson left at 10.30 
a.m. to investigate and arrived at Nissan at 11.10 a.m. 
After an hour's patrol of the area it made a "Nil sight-
ings" report at 12.53 p.m. and returned to Rabaul. 
Jervis later reported that as soon as he had sent in his 
report he had left in his pinnace to investigate. Nissan 
is an atoll with an interior lagoon and the only entrance 
on the West. Jervis was located on the eastern side 
and had to cross the lagoon. He got to the entrance 
about 11.30 a.m. having sighted the Hudson cruising 
about, shortly before he got there. The natives 
informed him that the plane on the water had taken 
off at 11 a.m. and only just disappeared to the South 
when the Hudson arrived. There seemed to be little 
doubt that the plane was a Japanese patrol aircraft 
that had struck some minor engine trouble, had landed 
on the calm waters of the ocean, effected repairs and 
then resumed its patrol. In the equatorial regions the 
ocean can often be a flat unruffled surface until late 
morning when the breezes spring up. The Japanese 
were lucky to be able to take off when they did; a bare 
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ten minutes later and they would have been at the 
mercy of the Hudson. 
On December 30 the Naval Board advised that on 
D/F fixes there were at least two Japanese Naval Units 
in the area between Truk and New Ireland at 11 a.m. 
on December 29. Kavieng had reported two air-craft 
to the North and heading west at 1.41 p.m. on Decem-
ber 29. As long range patrol aircraft did not fiy in 
pairs they were probably seaplanes from a seaplane 
tender or two carrier-borne aircraft brought down 
from Truk to a point where Northern New Ireland 
would be within their range. 
The last day of 1941 was uneventful. 
Hudsons Raid Kapingamarangi 
The R.A.A.F. opened 1942 with a raid by four 
Hudsons on Kapingamarangi at 2 p.m. They were 
intercepted by one two-seater enemy floatplane only, 
which they managed to drive off after disabling the 
observer. They successfully bombed some buildings 
and set light to two fuel dumps the smoke from which 
rose to a good 10,000 feet as the Hudsons could still 
see it when 60 miles on their return journey to Rabaul. 
Two of the aircraft had been armed with bombs with 
four second delay fuses. The aircrews were chagrined 
to see their bombs hit buildings, then bounce through 
and explode apparently harmlessly in trees 25 to 50 
yards from the targets. The other aircraft with 
bombs with instantaneous fuses were the ones that 
achieved the results. 
Otherwise New Year's Day 1942 was quiet, whilst 
nothing of any moment occurred on January 2 either. 
It was, however, only the calm before the storm. 
At 4.20 a.m. on January 3, three Hudsons again 
raided Kapingamarangi. This time they hit and 
destroyed a twin float biplane on a slipway. They also 
started four large fires which were still burning at 
5 a.m. as the Hudsons were flying back to Rabaul 
where they arrived safely at 7.30 a.m. The Japanese 
were evidently taken by surprise as although the 
Hudsons sighted three aircraft on the water or the 
slipways none took off and only one machine gun was 
observed to be firing at them. You will have noticed 
how the Hudson's bombing prowess was improving 
with practice. Also the R.A.A.F. were now arming all 
aircraft with instantaneous fused bombs and thus 
649 
avoiding having bombs hit a target and bounce off' 
before exploding comparatively harmlessly some dis-
tance away. 
At 8.36 a.m. on January 4, McDonald, the District 
Officer and coastwatcher at Kavieng reported a single 
aircraft southbound. We could not identify it and at 
9.43 a.m. a twin-engined Japanese bomber flew over 
Rabaul and off to the north again, before it could be 
intercepted by any of our aircraft which took to the 
air for this purpose. 
At 10 a.m.. Page, the coastwatcher at Tabar, 
reported he had heard aircraft passing south but too 
far off to sight. By this time the Wirraways and Hud-
sons were coming into refuel after their fruitless chase 
of the reconnaissance aircraft. 
First Japanese Raid 
About 10.15 I left the Naval Staff Office per bicycle 
to see the Air Force Intelligence Officer at the A.O.B. 
on the shore of the Harbour about a quarter of a mile 
away. On arrival there I found Robinson the Intelli-
gence Officer in the process of handing over to Mani-
fold, his successor, who had just arrived. They said 
they would not be long so I elected to wait as the 
matters I wanted to discuss were fairly urgent. I went 
on to the western side of the A.O.B. Building and sat 
on the landing rail looking roughly north-west and 
talked to an air force clerk who was sitting on the 
steps repairing a portable typewriter. Time passed 
and shortly before 10.40 a.m. I heard the sound of air-
craft somewhere in the north-west behind a bank of 
cloud. I said to the airman "We have not got any 
kites up at present, have we?" He said "I don't think 
so and I don't know of any expected fresh arrivals." 
I decided I had better break in on Robinson and Mani-
fold and slipped off the rail to do so when, to my amaze-
ment and horror, 16 large aircraft popped over the 
edge of the cloud bank I had been watching. I yelled 
to Robinson and Manifold and they darted out of the 
Intelligence Office, took one look and darted back to 
the telephones. I went with them, contacted the Naval 
Office on the direct line and found Mackenzie had just 
seen the aircraft himself. 
I decided my duty lay at the Naval Office, hopped 
on to my bicycle and got going. I am sure I would 
have qualified for Olympic Honours for the 400 metres 
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dash on a bicycle during that hectic ride, which all the 
same seemed interminable. I was riding towards the 
aircraft during most of the journey and I am sure my 
eyes grew stalks like a crab's—one watching the road 
and one the aircraft which seemed stuck in the sky 
just ahead of me. I arrived at the front of the Central 
Administration Building where our office was, fell off 
the bicycle, darted up the steps and found Mackenzie 
on his own. He had sent the four ratings on duty out-
side to the slit trenches on the lawn behind the build-
ing. Just then the building rocked to a series of 
resounding explosions in the vicinity of Lakunai Air-
field about a quarter of a mile away. The aircraft made 
the one run only and disappeared to the south-east 
where they no doubt turned over St. George's Channel 
and made their way back to Truk. 
We found that not more than 16 bombs had been 
dropped. They were of the anti-personnel variety, not 
unlike shrapnel shells. They had fallen south east of 
Lakunai close to the Native Hospital, causing 30 cas-
ualties among natives who had gathered to watch the 
aircraft, but otherwise no damage. It was ironical 
that the native casualties included 11 Papuans from 
Gawa Island who had been rescued only two days 
before from a canoe that had been caught in a squall in 
October 1941, lost mast and sail, and had been drifting 
north-east ever since. Their cargo of coconuts was all 
they had to subsist on, and five had died from their 
privations before the remaining 11 had been rescued 
off Metlik on the New Ireland coast. 
As I have said earlier all our aircraft that were 
serviceable were being refuelled so we had no attempt 
at interception of the raiders. Our A/A battery of two 
3' ' guns, both of which had defective sights, got off 
a few rounds but without effect. 
More Raiders Arrive 
At 6.8 p.m. Page of Tabar came on the air again 
to report 11 large aircraft southbound. By the time 
the raiders arrived over Rabaul it was dark and need-
less to say our blackout was wellnigh 100 per cent, 
perfect. A small inter-island vessel, the Duranbah, 
arrived from Pondo at 6.52 p.m. and immediately it got 
into Simpson's Harbour lit up like the proverbial ship 
at sea. Signal lamps flashed madly from all directions 
and once the captain got the idea about an air raid 
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being due in about 5 minutes, the Duranbah literally 
went out like a light and hove to in midharbour. 
'At 7.1 p.m. the raiders arrived. For 11 aircraft 
they made an incredible amount of noise and we real-
ised that they must be f our-engined and probably giant 
Kawanisi Flying Boats which combined the best quali-
ties of the Sunderland and the Catalina, as well as 
being armed with 20 millimetre cannon and .5 machine 
guns. 
They droned around for the next ten minutes and 
finally appeared to line up south of Vunakanau air-
field and then made their bombing run. However, it 
was too dark for success and although they dropped 
100 bombs, the size of which payload confirmed that 
they were Kawanisis, the nearest to Vunakanau was 
half-a-mile distant and the only casualty was one 
native who had the misfortune to be walking along a 
track in the area at the time the bombs fell. 
Thus Rabaul had its baptism of fire and shots 
fired in anger. 
On January 5 Page of Tabar again reported, at 
9.7 a.m., a distant sound of aircraft southbound. At 
10.34 a.m. Army personnel at Kokopo reported two 
aircraft proceeding towards Rabaul. Due to cloudy 
conditions the aircraft were not sighted, but were 
probably reconnaissance aircraft endeavouring to 
ascertain the damage done by the previous day's raids. 
Interrupted Haircuts 
January 6 was uneventful and at 5 p.m. Mackenzie 
got one of the local barbers to call and we all had much 
needed haircuts. The ratings on duty were done then 
I had mine. Mackenzie had just sat down and had had 
the initial runover with the clippers when at 5.55 p.m. 
Allen, the coastwatcher at Mioko in the Duke of Yorks 
in St. George's Channel reported eight large aircraft 
proceeding towards Rabaul. The harboring stopped 
abruptly. After telephoning the warning to Army and 
Air Force that raiders would be over the town in about 
five minutes, Mackenzie, the Yeoman of Signals, 
Knight, and I joined the ratings and barber on the 
back lawn. I might mention that the Burns Philp 
vessel Malaita of some 4,000 tons at exactly 6 o.m., 
entered Simpson's Harbour, followed two minutes later 
by the small inter-island vessel Mako of some 300 tons. 
At 6.2 p.m. nine Kawanisi Plying boats came into sight 
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over the Mother Mountain, proceeded West in V forma-
tion across the Harbour, turned in a southerly direction 
and dropped their load on Vunakanau at 6.7 p.m. Our 
A/A guns blazed away but all rounds fired burst short. 
The Air Force had no time to get aircraft up. The 
enemy formation after it had dropped its bombs swung 
in a long arc through east and passed again over the 
town and Harbour at 6.14 p.m. and left on a north-
westerly course disappearing from view at 6.25 p.m. 
Two Wirraways finally got off from Lakunai but had 
not the speed to catch up with the raiders. 
At Vunakanau half the airfield was put out of 
commission temporarily but enough was left for 
Hudsons and Wirraways to use. One Wirraway was 
destroyed by a direct hit from one of the 72 bombs the 
raiders dropped. 
At 6.30 p.m. the imperturbable Mackenzie resumed 
having his hair cut without further interruption. 
At 7.29 p.m. McDonald of Kavieng reported the 
raiders homeward bound to Truk. He caused some 
alarm at first as he first heard them in the south and 
reported them going in that direction. However, a few 
minutes later he corrected this. 
As I have said earlier, big things had been 
intended for Rabaul, but the swiftness of the Japanese 
advance threw out the Allies' calculations. We got a 
clear indication that we had been given away by the 
Commonwealth when orders were received that a large 
cargo of boom defence gear in the Malaita was not to 
be unloaded but returned to Australia in the ship 
which sailed for Sydney at 6.15 p.m. on January 8. 
Hudsons Retaliate 
On January 7 two Hudsons left Rabaul at 3 a.m. 
and attacked Kapingamarangi at 5.30 a.m. They 
destroyed a slipped seaplane and heavy A/A tracer 
machine gun fire ceased after the aircraft dropped 
their bombs. Both aircraft returned safely to Rabaul 
at 8.44 a.m. At 10.30 a.m. Page of Tabar reported air-
craft on a southerly course. Allen of Mioko reported 
them at 10.58 a.m. At 11.2 a.m. 18 enemy aircraft 
were sighted over Rabaul and dropped 78 bombs on 
Vunakanau a few minutes later. This time they really 
hurt us — the Hudsons which had carried out the 
raid earlier in the day were being serviced and another 
was being readied for a patrol. One was entirely 
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destroyed and the other two damaged, one badly but 
not beyond repair. A Wirraway was also damaged as 
were some of the airfield buildings. The enemy aircraft 
were twin-engined bombers and faster than the big 
flying boats. Previous raids had been made at heights 
of between 8,000 to 12,000 feet, but this was a true 
pattern bombing raid from 18,000 feet. The raiders 
departed at 11.16 a.m. on a N.N.W. course but evidently 
changed course a little as Tabar sighted them at 11.54 
a.m. homeward bound to Truk. 
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Rabaul and Environs. 
On January 8 Mioko reported a single aircraft 
bound for Rabaul at 10.17 a.m. At 10.23 a.m. this air-
craft was sighted at about 15,000 feet over Vunakanau. 
Five Wirraways took off from Lakunai but failed to 
intercept. This was obviously a photo reconnaissance 
aircraft and was sighted by Kavieng at 11.16 a.m. 
northbound. 
At 6.2 p.m. on the same day Tabar reported the 
noise of distant aircraft proceeding south. Rabaul 
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was completely cloud-covered at the time and no 
hostile aircraft materialised. They may have turned 
back or it could have been a patrol which usually 
passed Tabar about this time. Page had some even-
ings earlier actually seen the patrol aircraft turn onto 
the next leg of its course to the north-east in the 
general direction of Ponape. 
Japanese Patrol Activity 
On January 9 there was a marked increase in 
Japanese patrol activity. Apart from Tabar, Buka 
Passage and Kieta in Bougainville reported sightings, 
whilst Tulagi was circled twice by a Kawanisi flying 
boat. 
On January 10 Goode, the coastwatcher at Kessa 
on Buka Island, reported six aircraft flying south at 
1.33 p.m. Buka Passage also reported through Read 
the coastwatcher there that six planes had been 
sighted which however turned north at 2.2 p.m. The 
planes were not ours and apparently the Japanese were 
making reconnaissance flights in force with seaplanes 
or carrier aircraft. 
The R.A.A.F. decided to make Kavieng and 
Lorenga in the Admiralties forward operational bases 
and on January 11 arranged for fuel and oil stocks to 
be available at those places. On January 12 a Hudson 
was despatched from Port Moresby to Kavieng. The 
Air Force also advised that any dusk sightings by the 
coastwatcher at Emirau Island could be our own air-
craft on a secret operation. They were in fact going 
to try and bomb Truk with Catalinas on the night of 
January 12/13, but weather prevented the aircraft 
getting anywhere near Truk. 
During January 13 and 14 the air seemed to be 
full of Catalinas coming and going although there were 
only six of them involved. Enemy sightings tailed off 
until January 16. 
On January 15 the Norwegian vessel Herstein 
arrived from Port Moresby with equipment for the 
Army including anti-tank guns, but with only limited 
supplies of ammunition for the same. Herstein was to 
load 6,100 tons of copra before being despatched to 
Australia. 
Catalinas Raid Truk 
The Air Force by scratching the bottom of the 
barrel, got eight Catalinas together to bomb Truk. The 
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aircraft left Kavieng at 6 p.m. on January 15 but one 
crashed on take-off with the loss of its whole crew. 
The remaining aircraft met shocking weather just 
north of the Equator and only one (A24/14 - Flight 
Lieut. Purton) succeeded in breaking through and 
arrived over the target at 2 a.m. on January 16. It was 
there for 50 minutes. It dropped two sticks of 8 x 250 
lb. bombs from 6,500 feet on East, West runs and 
saw the flashes of all bombs dropped. Closer observa-
tion was impossible on account of cloud. The Japanese 
must have felt fairly secure at Truk as the blackout on 
the islands in the atoll was not complete and numerous 
small lights were observed. The ground defences both 
A/A and searchlights were slow to open up and when 
they did they under-ranged the aircraft. No enemy 
air activity was observed. 
This was the first and last occasion on which the 
North East Area managed to get an aircraft through 
to Truk. 
On the morning of January 16 the air was again 
full of Catalinas returning from the Truk operation. 
It was also full of less friendly aircraft. Tabar reported 
an aircraft at 6.18 a.m. on a S.W. course and at 10.38 
a.m. an enemy aircraft flew over Rabaul and off to the 
N.N.W. at a great height. 
At 11.34 a.m. Kavieng reported one southbound 
aircraft. At 12.2 p.m. Mioko reported 20 aircraft head-
ing towards Rabaul. They were sighted to the south-
east at 12.10 and bombed the S.E. end of Vunakanau 
from 12,000 feet at 12.13, fortunately doing only small 
damage. At 12.52 Tabar reported the raiders home-
ward bound. 
Reports come in from Wau between 10 and 10.30 
a.m., Madang at 11 a.m. and Kavieng at 2.14 p.m. of a 
four-engined aircraft — probably the same aircraft 
carrying out a reconnaissance and homeward bound 
when sighted at Kavieng. 
Raiders Drop 40 Bombs 
Then at 5.30 p.m. Kavieng reported five aircraft 
flying south. At 6.35 p.m. the raiders appeared over 
Rabaul from the N.N.E. and dropped about 40 bombs 
near Lakunai without damage. The A/A fire was much 
closer this time and loosened up the raiders tight V 
formation considerably which prevented precision 
bombing. The raiders were again Kawanisis and flew 
off to the N.E. at 6.40 p.m. They did not linger. We 
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had no steel helmets and when some pieces of shrapnel 
from the A/A shells thudded down nearby we hurriedly 
got hold of some lead covered code books and held 
those on our heads for protection. 
Instructions were received from Feldt to endeav-
our to have a coastwatcher placed on the east coast of 
New Ireland at the position where the raiders crossed 
it. This would give more warning of raids than that 
we received from Mioko only. It was a good thought 
but our time was running out too fast for it to be 
implemented. 
On January 17 two Hudsons from Kavieng 
attacked a 6,000 ton Japanese ship at Kapingamarangi 
at 1.30 p.m. They dropped eight bombs but scored no 
hits. They saw a number of floatplanes in the lagoon 
which apparently took off after them because when 
they arrived back at Kavieng at 3.40 p.m. they reported 
pursuit by six planes and took off again for Rabaul 
at 3.45. However, the enemy planes did not arrive at 
Kavieng. They must have had to turn back as it was 
beyond their range. 
At about 2 p.m. a Wirraway from Kavieng had 
attacked a Kawanisi flying boat until forced to break 
off the action for lack of ammunition. It reported no 
visible result, which was hardly surprising. Unless 
hit in a vital part or the pilots killed, a Kawanisi 
could absorb a lot of .303 machine gun fire and still get 
back to its base. 
On January 18 the R.A.A.F. made its last attack 
on Kapingamarangi. Two Hudsons made the raid and 
destroyed one plane and launch, with two launches off 
the jetties probably sunk. No large ships were seen. 
On both January 18 and 19 there was only the 
usual enemy reconnaissance and our own. 
Coast Defence Battery 
I have not said much about the Army up to the 
present as their role apart from the A/A Battery had 
been so far an inactive one. During their months in 
Rabaul however, they had established a coast defence 
battery at Praed Point with two obsolescent 6'' naval 
guns. Roads leading into the Town had had tank 
traps constructed on them and strong posts had been 
built at suitable points. They even had constructed a 
strong concrete dugout as a Command Post for the 
area. The one weakness in all they had done was that 
they had a bare 1,500 troops to defend the coastline of 
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the Crater Peninsula (a good 20 miles) and the shores 
of Simpson Harbour (close on another 15 miles). If 
the coast defence guns were not harmed they could 
defend the town and harbour; but lacking the guns the 
town and harbour became indefensible. As Secretary 
of the Inter-Service Committee at Port Moresby, I had 
six months previously prepared a plan for the denial 
of port installations and facilities in the Territories to 
an enemy. The Commandant 8 M.D. when he read the 
plan scoffed at it. He told me I had been reading too 
much about the Russian "scorched earth" policy. His 
idea was that if, say, the Japanese did take Rabaul we 
might take it back in a matter of weeks and would 
need the installations I was proposing to destroy so the 
enemy could not have them. When I said I hoped that 
the hypothetical enemy would have the same views 
when it came his turn to lose the installation, I really 
got a "ticking off." In consequence, there was no plan to 
destroy Rabaul before an invader got it. Whilst 
Mackenzie and I had other fish to fry, we were sorely 
tempted when the need arose to go round setting a 
torch to Rabaul, but were both a bit scared of Feldt's 
reaction, for as far as he was concerned we had to 
attempt a definite objective with no side issues allowed. 
To get back to the Army. By January 19, 1942, 
they knew they could expect no help. It was known by 
then that the "Brisbane Line" had been decided on by 
the Commonwealth Government, and that there were 
actually 30 "Kittyhawk" fighters in Brisbane with 
more becoming available. In the meantime, Malaya 
and the Philippines were in desperate straits from lack 
of airpower, but at least they had something better 
than Wirraways. 
A Sorry Muddle 
As far as the fate of the garrison was concerned 
the policymakers vacillated from holding Rabaul to 
the last man to evacuation and back again. They even 
considered guerilla warfare in the jungles of the 
Gazelle Peninsula, quite overlooking the fact that 
there was no provision at all made for this. In the 
end, they decided to contest the western shore of the 
Harbour so the troops retreat would not be cut off. 
They did not apparently consider just where the troops 
would retreat to when the Japanese bundled them off 
the western shore of the Harbour. The civil popula-
tion, or those of them who were lucky enough to 
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receive any instructions, was told to get out of the 
town for the battle. All told, it was a sorry muddle, 
with the 1,500 troops about to be sacrificed on the 
altar of political ineptitude. 
Then it was the morning of Tuesday, January 20, 
1942. As the reporting centre for the Territory of 
New Guinea Coastwatching network, we were having 
a busy time as Japanese reconnaissance aircraft were 
inordinately active over New Ireland, Buka, the 
Admiralties and the New Guinea mainland from 
Wewak to Salamaua. Reports came in with monoton-
ous regularity. Mackenzie and I did nothing 
else but pass reports to Army and Air Force Head-
quarters and draw up signals for passing onto Naval 
Authorities at Port Moresby and on the mainland of 
Australia. All seven communications ratings on the 
staff were on duty coding these signals, but even then 
they were banking up as the reports continued to flow 
in. 
As the morning progressed, everybody started to 
feel that some significant move was afoot on the part 
of the enemy, but no one realised how quickly it would 
materialise. 
The first indication came at 12.10 p.m. when Page 
at Tabar reported a large number of aircraft had 
passed his island on a S.W. course, but they had been 
too far off to tell how many. It was apparent then that 
an air raid was in store for us, but air raids by now had 
more or less become a matter of routine, and local 
Army, Air Force and Civil Defence Authorities, having 
been advised to expect a raid by the end of the next 
half-hour, a signal was prepared for despatch to other 
Naval Authorities before the raid commenced. One or 
other of the coastwatchers on the track taken by the 
enemy aircraft had given warning of every one of the 
six preceding raids and experience had quickly shown 
what time would elapse between the various warnings 
and the advent of the raiders over Rabaul. 
No Ordinary Hit and Run Raid 
Ten minutes after the first report there came the 
first indication that this was to be no ordinary hit and 
run raid. 
District Officer Kyle, the coastwatcher at Nama-
tanai, reported upwards of 50 aircraft had passed the 
New Ireland coast on a S.W. course. It was apparent 
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that Rabaul was in for a heavy plastering by the 
enemy but, in view of the fact that up to 20 aircraft 
had been employed in previous raids and only one of 
the two airfields had been attacked on each occasion, 
it seemed that it was intended to attack both Lakunai 
and Vunakanau airfields simultaneously on this occa-
sion. 
On the first warning being received, the R.A.A.F. 
had put its total serviceable fighter strength — the 
famous six Wirraways — into the air and by 12.30 p.m. 
the Wirraways were patrolling at 10,000 feet over the 
volcano, Matupi, at the entrance to the harbour. 
Sky Filled with Aircraft 
At 12.35 p.m. the coastwatcher at Mioko in the 
Duke of York Islands reported the sky was filled with 
aircraft — a minute or two later he reported over 100. 
The alarm had been sounded on his first report, and on 
his rough count being received the ominous nature of 
the raid was fully realised; the Japanese evidently 
aimed at inflicting a crushing blow. The other raids 
had been tests of strength, but this one was to mark 
the commencement of a softening up process. 
Mackenzie and I had by this time organised obser-
vation points for the ratings and ourselves along the 
150-yard line between the harbour and the staff office, 
which gave us collectively an all-round view of the 
town, the Lakunai airfield and the harbour areas, 
whilst the plateau where Vunakanau airfield lay was 
visible to all. Suddenly one of the coders called out 
that there appeared to be a dogfight in progress over 
Matupi. Where the six Wirraways had been there 
were now 30 to 40 aircraft weaving wildly — all of 
them single-engined. The Japanese had brought their 
Zero fighters with them, and the only possible explana-
tion was that they had a carrier lurking off the east 
coast of New Ireland. An enemy carrier had been 
reported some days previously as leaving the Marshalls 
for the Truk area, but it was now apparent what its 
real destination was, and the intensive reconnaissance 
activity by the enemy was also explained. They had 
to be sure that there was nothing in the area that could 
strike back at the carrier. 
The Wirraways never had a chance — two of 
them were shot down in as many minutes and the rest 
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just brushed aside, more or less contemptuously, as 
the Zeros went on to ground strafe the two airfields. 
At that moment, however, from all four points of 
the compass, 72 heavy bombers arrived in four 
formations, each at a slightly different level and the 
highest formation at no greater height than 6,000 feet. 
The formations from the east and west, respectively, 
lined up and commenced a series of runs over Vuna-
kanau, the formation from the north swung round 
through the west and commenced a run to the east 
over Lakunai, whilst the last formation kept on its 
northerly course and headed straight for the town! 
Wirraways Attack Bombers 
The four Wirraways seemed to realise the hope-
lessness of chasing the Zeros and, breaking their own 
formation, a Wirraway gallantly headed in the direc-
tion of each formation of bombers. The formations 
over the airfields had released their bombs and the 
punctuated roar of the explosions made the whole area 
tremble. The formation headed for the town let its 
bombs go and its target became clear—the valueless 
hulk Westralia in which a local shipping company had 
previously stored coal and which was now lying on the 
northern side of the harbour waiting to be towed out 
to sea and scuttled, as it had been dragging its anchors 
and menacing the Catalina moorings. The Japanese 
were welcome to send down all the bombs they liked at 
Westralia in its conspicuous anchorage and it was 
hoped they would thereby miss seeing the fast modern 
7,000 ton motor vessel Herstein, inconspicuously 
berthed at the copra wharf on the north-west side of 
the harbour — a hope, however, that was not to be 
realised. 
The garrison's two 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, with 
their defective sights, had opened fire from Observa-
tory Ridge as each formation came in range and were 
commencing to close their targets as the necessary 
adjustments were made in sighting. 
A Bomber Shot Down 
The Wirraways continued to harass the bomber 
foundations and, as the formation over Lakunai came 
sliding back from the east to make its second run, the 
ack-ack scored a hit on a bomber near the head of the 
formation. It plunged out of line, but recovered and 
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then headed off to the north. The attendant Wirraway 
seized its opportunity and, diving on the injured 
bomber, inexorably began to ride it down. The bomber 
pilot struggled to keep his altitude, but his plane had 
become an easy mark, even for a Wirraway's two .303 
machine guns. Fatally hit at last, the bomber failed to 
clear the looming bulk of the Mother Mountain and, as 
it crashed, its remaining bombs went off in a sheet of 
flame. 
The formation attending to the Westralia com-
menced its second run, this time from the north. Even 
as its bombs whistled over the Naval Staff Office 
towards their target, disaster befell the lone Wirraway 
which had been darting in and out of the formation in 
a fruitless effort to break or divert it. By some mis-
chance, the slow-moving fighter came into the field of 
fire of the rear gunners, so it seemed, of all 18 bombers 
and literally disintegrated in the air. 
The Zeros had finished their strafing runs over the 
airfields and were now roaming at will over the whole 
area. Four of them attempted to attack the ack-ack 
positions, but heavy machine gun fire from the pro-
tective positions around the guns drove them off, 
despite several attempts to knock the gun crews out, 
including blind zooming attacks from behind the spur 
of the North Daughter to the rear of the gun positions. 
The remaining Wirraways were now practically 
at the limit of their endurance and, after further 
brushes with the Zeros, two of them managed to mako 
Vunakanau, but were followed in and strafed. The 
crews escaped, but one aircraft was destroyed and the 
other rendered temporarily unserviceable. 
Dive Bombers Arrive 
The time was now 1.10 p.m. and all the heavy 
bombers were making their last runs while the Zeros 
began to form up in patrols above them. Suddenly, a 
single-engined aircraft came in over the town from the 
North at a little more than 1,500 feet. It was directly 
over the Naval Staff Office when it executed a peel off 
turn and screamed down in a steep dive towards 
Herstein — the dive bombers had arrived. It was 
followed in quick succession by two others, while three 
more came from the north-west and commenced to 
attack Westralia, still unhit and afioat after being at 
the receiving end of seventy-two 500 lb. bombs. A 
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further three dive bombers came in over Lakunai and 
accounted for the last Wirraway, which had just come 
in to refuel, with a direct hit. Three more could be 
seen attacking installations at Vunakanau. 
Each dive bomber carried two 5001b. bombs and 
the six attacks on Herstein left the ship and her cargo 
of copra ablaze. The ack-ack, in a vain atempt to beat 
off the dive bombers from the ship, were firing on a 
flat trajectory from their hilltop. They had bagged 
another two heavy bombers, but found firing at dive 
bombers over open sights was just a bit too tricky to 
give them further successes. 
Despite the six attacks on Westralia, she did not 
burn and remained afloat for nearly an hour after the 
attack had finished. 
At 1.25 p.m. the dive bombers and their Zero 
escort formed up in a leisurely manner over the town 
and flew off to the north-east to rejoin their carrier. 
The raid was over. 
Despite their limitations, the Wirriways had 
accounted for two other heavy bombers, besides the 
one brought down in conjunction with the ack-ack. It 
was a noble effort on their part and well merits its 
place with the other great, forlorn hopes of the war. 
Strenuous efforts were made to save Herstein, but, 
as the copra wharf was ablaze too, this fire had to be 
subdued before the fires on the ship could be got at. 
As night fell, the ship's mooring lines parted and, 
drifting before a light north-west breeze, she came like 
a slow-moving beacon across the harbour and 
grounded gently on a reef within fifty yards of the 
spot where Westralia had gone down. By the next 
morning she was completely gutted, but sitting firmly 
on the reef. Even as a dead ship Herstein continued 
to serve the Allied cause. When the Japanese took 
Rabaul, they left the burnt-out hulk where it was for 
many months. During that time Herstein was the 
yardstick by which the photographic interpretation 
branch of the Allied Air Forces measured the dimen-
sions and calculated the tonnage of every Japanese 
vessel disclosed by photographic reconnaissance as 
among those present in Rabaul Harbour — information 
of no small value when it came to assessing the 
significance of enemy shipping concentrations there. 
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Insufficient Air Strength 
Although the coastwatching organisation had 
given valuable warnings of the raid in its impending 
stages, there was, unfortunately, insufficient air 
strength to enable the fullest possible advantage to 
be taken of the information thus received. The time 
was to come, however, when similar warnings were to 
cost the Japanese many times the number of aircraft 
they had used on this occasion — over Guadalcanal, for 
instance, when they lost upwards of 800 aircraft at the 
rate of nearly one an hour. Rabaul, though too weak 
to defend itself, had proved that the idea that the 
element of surprise could be taken from air attacks in 
a Pacific war was correct. It remained for growing 
Allied strength to give the idea its practical applica-
tion. 
To cap the disasters of the day, a Hudson failed 
to arrive at Rabaul and was presumed lost at sea. It 
may have had the misfortune to run into the Zeros. 
We shall never know. 
Having once put the pressure on, the Japanese 
kept it up on January 21. There was intensive recon-
naissance as on the previous day. Salamaua, Lae and 
Madang on the New Guinea mainland were bombed as 
also was Kavieng. Lorengan on Manus in the Admiral-
ties was strafed by machine guns and cannon. 
Enemy Cruisers Sighted 
Then at 2.31 p.m. a Hudson on patrol sighted four 
enemy cruisers 140 miles N.W. of Rabaul and steaming 
towards us. It was evident that we could anticipate, 
if not a landing, at least a naval bombardment before 
we were much older. The raid on January 20 had 
disclosed that beyond doubt we had no air umbrella 
and lay open to attacks from sea and air. 
The time had come for Mackenzie to make and 
carry out one of the big decisions that a Naval Officer 
may have to face in time of war. 
The laws of the Navy are many and varied—some, 
certainly, permit of being honoured in the breach 
rather than in the observance, but there are others 
which must be obeyed in the face of all dangers, hard-
ships and obstacles. Such a one is the rule that secret 
and confidential documents must be destroyed at all 
costs to prevent their falling into the hands of an 
enemy. The compromising of a code may endanger the 
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movements and plans of a fieet or convoy before the 
necessary warning of the compromise can be issued. 
The war against Germany and Japan showed, on a 
number of occasions, that Naval Shore Staffs might, 
with the best will in the world, have arrangements on 
hand to destroy their "C.Bs." (secret and confidential 
books) but that they tended to overlook one vital 
factor — time. "C.Bs." are usually stoutly constructed 
with lead weighted covers to hasten their descent to 
the ocean bed in the event of risk of capture afioat, 
but when it comes to destroying by fire ashore, it is a 
long job, even with the help of combustibles, such as 
petrol or kerosene. 
Destruction of Documents 
When the Japanese advance to the south in 1942 
was rolling on and seemingly unstoppable, the Admir-
alty was gravely concerned over the possible compro-
mise of "C.Bs." and informed all Stations that their 
destruction must be accomplished at all costs to avoid 
capture by the enemy. The Australian Common-
wealth Naval Board, in its turn, passed the instruction 
to all Naval Authorities on the Australia Station, but 
fortunately the instruction never had to be imple-
mented on his Station, save in one instance — Rabaul. 
Normally, we would have had very few "C.Bs.", 
but pre-Pearl Harbour, the powers that be with the 
great things they had in view for Rabaul had, before 
anything else had passed the blue print stage, com-
menced building up the "C.B." establishment until 
Mackenzie was, by the time of the outbreak of the 
Pacific War, the custodian of a quantity and quality of 
"C.Bs." such as is usually found only in a port where 
there is a full Naval Staff headed by a Naval Officer in 
Charge of at least Commander's rank. 
Rabaul Out On A Limb 
When the Japanese started to favour Rabaul with 
their attention, Mackenzie had a large trench dug out-
side the back of the Staff Office and cached half-a-dozen 
four gallon tins of petrol close by. It was apparent 
that Rabaul was out on a limb. The time that must 
elapse before it was lopped off as another Japanese 
conquest was entirely up to the Japanese themselves. 
At 4 p.m. Mackenzie and I commenced to burn our 
"C.Bs." A roaring fire was kindled in the trench with 
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the aid of the petrol and some dismembered packing 
cases. The first book was ripped apart and its leaves 
ceremonially consigned to the flames. Then for the 
next seven hours we carried on with the job of tearing 
up books and documents and feeding the fire with 
them. Some of the basic code books, with the lead 
weighted covers referred to, turned out to be so stoutly 
built that they had to be chopped and cut apart with 
a tomahawk. There was no doubt that they were 
meant to stay on the sea-bottom once they reached it 
— the risk of pages coming loose was negligible. 
By 11 p.m. only one current code remained 
undestroyed and it was decided to retain this for a 
while, as it would not take overlong to destroy it and 
it could be used as long as W/T communication through 
Rabaul Radio (VJZ) remained open. However, by 
4 a.m. on January 22 the Army had decided not to 
defend the town and the troops began to move to their 
positions on the western side of the harbour. 
Figgis, the M.I.O., told Mackenzie that the early 
destruction of the W/T Station was also ordered. 
Mackenzie had his last signal announcing the destruc-
tion of the "C.Bs." coded up for transmission and then 
the remaining code was destroyed. 
Appeal to Enemy Curiosity 
Mackenzie and I were looking at the empty safes 
after the destruction of the books when we decided it 
was rather tame to leave them as they were — things 
ought to be made interesting for the Japanese. We 
had no materials for booby traps, but decided an 
appeal to enemy curiosity could be just as annoying. 
Reams of unused stationery, lead bars used as paper 
weights and even humble boulders were crammed 
into the safes until they were filled to bursting point. 
The doors were then locked and the keys subsequently 
consigned to the bottom of the harbour. No doubt the 
Japanese, after they had moved in during the early 
hours of January 23, spent a busy day blowing all the 
safes open to make certain they contained nothing of 
value. It must have been irritating, to say the least, 
for the enemy when each time a safe was opened a 
mass of rubbish came before their gaze. They must 
have realised then the significance of the nearby 
trench, full of sifted ashes, from which they had no 
chance of obtaining any information at all. The 
"C.Bs." were safe from any possibility of compromise. 
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At 2 a.m. on January 22, Mackenzie sent me with 
two ratings and an N.G.V.R. private named Stone, who 
had until a few hours before been an A.W.A. Radio 
Station Operator, to Toma on a mountain ridge south 
of Vunakanau to pick up our teleradio and stores. We 
commandeered a car that turned out to have a badly 
worn clutch. As we crawled up hills with engine roar-
ing we nearly frightened the wits out of several army 
posts, especially where we had come down a rise com-
paratively silently before hitting the next slope. I 
found out later from Mackenzie that in the pre-dawn 
hour the Army posts near Vunakanau kept reporting 
the sound of aircraft whilst all the time it had been 
our wretched car. It was a still, windless night and 
the ridges amplified the noise we made. 
We crossed the Vunakanau airfield at first light. 
The last Hudson was just taking off for Port Moresby 
whilst the ground staff had already commenced their 
long ride and walk to Wide Bay where they had to be 
by the evening of January 23 to be picked up by Cata-
linas and flown out to Port Moresby. 
We eventually crawled into Toma at 6.30 a.m. on 
January 22 — four and a-half hours for a trip that 
should have taken us only two hours at the most, even 
allowing for the strange road and the fact that we 
could only use parking lights. 
No attacks had been made so far on the two 6" 
guns at Praed Point, but there could be no doubt that 
the enemy knew they were there, for the raw scars 
left on the point as a result of the installation of the 
guns were plainly visible from the air. It seemed that 
it was intended to first silence the guns by bombard-
ment from the sea, with the assistance, perhaps, of an 
air attack, and then to make a landing at will. 
Concentrating Defence 
As their fixed defences were still intact, the Army, 
as I have said, was inclined to consider a last ditch 
defence of Rabaul and the Crater Peninsula, but, as 
this course would render it easy for any larger force to 
contain the troops in the Peninsula and then break 
them from the air, they ultimately decided to concen-
trate on the defence of the western side of Simpson's 
Harbour and to maintain a tenuous patrol link with 
the fixed defences for as long as was possible or neces-
sary, according to the tactics employed by the enemy. 
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As no air attacks had materialised on January 21, 
aerial support for any sea bombardment on January 22 
became a certainty. 
The wary Japanese, however, were not prepared 
to do anything from the sea until they had made their 
certainty even more certain. January 22 dawned 
bright and clear, but it brought no sea or air attacks 
at first light, as anticipated. The waters around New 
Briain remained clear of enemy shipping. The reason 
for this temporary reprieve soon became manifest. 
At 6.30 a.m. the New Ireland coastwatchers, 
whose posts lay on the air route from Truk to Rabaul, 
began reporting large numbers of heavy bombers on 
the, by now, well worn south-westerly course to the 
latter. At 7.00 a.m. the first 18 bombers came into 
sight and, instead of making for their usual targets — 
the airfields — they swung out to the east over St. 
George's Channel and commenced a northerly run over 
Praed Point. They were out of range of the two 3' ' 
A.A. guns on Observatory Ridge at the head of the 
Harbour, and could carry out their pattern bombing 
at will. As they came over their target. Zero fighters 
flashed in and commenced low level strafing attacks 
on both Lakunai and Vunakanau airfields — just on 
the offchance that the defenders had some stray air-
craft left which they might t ry to put into the air 
against the bombers. 
Waves of Bombers 
As their 500 kilo, bombs crashed on the battery 
positions, the bombers swung away and swiftly 
headed north. They were nearly out of sight by the 
time the second wave of eighteen bombers came in 
on their run. The Japanese were taking their time, 
allowing the dust of the first series of explosions to 
settle before delivering the second instalment of 
bombs. And so, at spaced intervals, a third and fourth 
formation of eighteen bombers came in and rained 
destruction on the battery. 
By this time the fighters had broken formation 
and were doing victory rolls and other aerobatics over 
the town and harbour — they had to fill in time in 
some way. Meanwhile, a twin-engined aircraft, 
obviously on reconnaissance duty, flew in a leisurely 
manner round the area with camera working overtime. 
As the last of the heavy bombers left their target, 
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the battery reported one gun and crew destroyed, 
whilst the other gun was damaged, but only slightly, 
although several of the crew had been killed or 
wounded. 
On the heels of this report come another that six 
single-engined aircraft had passed over the battery 
and swung round towards the town. 
They were dive bombers, come to finish the work 
of the "heavies." The formation flew up the harbour 
and, when over the town and obscured from the 
battery by the thick 5,000 feet column of smoke aris-
ing from the volcano, Matupi, they commenced to peel 
off and dive down on the battery — the first two or 
three actually passing through the volcanic smoke and 
flashing down on to the battery before the few remain-
ing defensive positions could get their machine guns 
to bear on the aircraft. No second attack by the dive 
bombers was needed — the remaining gun was blown 
right out of its mounting and even more completely 
wrecked than the first. 
The reconnaissance aircraft lumbered back and 
forth over the remains of the battery and then accom-
panied by the fighters flew off in the wake of the dive 
bombers to the north. 
During the remainder of January 22, the coast-
watchers, in turn, reported the progress of the inva-
sion fleet down the east coast of New Ireland. The 
landing commenced at 2 a.m. on January 23 and, 24 
hours after the destruction of the battery had been 
completed, the little garrison had been overwhelmed 
and Rabaul was in Japanese hands. 
What happened after that is another story. 
